# Multi-Plank Counterplan

## 1NC

#### Counterplan: [Aff Actor] should

#### Increase funding for hiring new police officers

#### And introduce CompStat technology into departments

#### It’s effective in significantly reducing crime and causing internal reform – empirics prove.

* Internal reform within policy department – spills down
* Four parts – timely and accurate information or intelligence, raid deployment of resources, effective tactics, relentless follow-up

Inimai M. Chettiar, 2015

Chettiar is the director of the Justice Program at New York University Law School’s Brennan Center. “More Police, Managed More Effectively, Really Can Reduce Crime”

Can simply adding more police officers to the streets, or changing the ways in which they operate, actually reduce the rate of crime? A report from the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, [What Caused the Crime Decline?](https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/what-caused-crime-decline), provides an answer to this question. **Two specific approaches to policing really can bring down crime. First, increasing numbers of police officers** can reduce crime. Increased police in the 1990s brought down crime by about 5 percent (this could range from 0 to 10 percent). Police employment increased dramatically in the 1990s, rising 28 percent. One major contributor was the 1994 Crime Bill, which provided funding for 100,000 new local officers. A body of empirical research has found that simply having more officers on the streets, even if they are not arresting or stopping anyone, can be a crime deterrent. We **also** find that **police techniques can be effective in reducing crime**. Interestingly, the biggest impact has come from something that gets a lot less ink than controversial measures such as stop-and-frisk or the use of military equipment. Credit the digital revolution. During the 1990s, **police forces started using computers** to target their efforts. The technique goes by the name CompStat. **Part management tool, part geographical data-driven analysis, CompStat was developed in the 1980s to combat subway crime in New York City.** Originally, it was no more complex than sticking pins into a subway map on the wall, **looking for patterns**. But it worked. Police commissioner Bill Bratton then implemented it full-scale into the NYPD in 1994. It then spread, in some form, to many big cities around the country. We analyzed crime data from the 50 largest cities. Forty-one currently use some form of CompStat. We find that the introduction of CompStat is associated with a roughly 10 percent decrease in crime (this could vary from 5 to 15 percent). In other words, crime is about 10 percent lower in a city that uses a program like CompStat than in an otherwise identical city without it. The effect holds true for violent crime, property crime, and homicide. CompStat, of course, varies city to city. And in some places it has faced criticism. In New York, for example, it is sometimes argued that CompStat can lead to overly aggressive policing, akin to stop-and-frisk. HBO’s “The Wire” highlighted the risk of officers “juking the stats” when utlitizing CompStat. But it is critical to understand that CompStat is not a proxy for any of these tactics that police use on the ground in neighborhoods. CompStat is about what happens inside police departments. The hallmarks of CompStat are its strong management and accountability techniques within a police department, as well as its reliance on data collection to identify crime patterns to then choose locations and tactics to deploy resources to break those patterns. Adding more police officers, and adopting strong, proven management techniques, can actually reduce the rate of crime. Even their combined impact, though, accounts for only a fraction of the documented reductions. Changes in law enforcement are a key part of the larger puzzle, accelerating and reinforcing the other factors that combined to produce the historic drop in crime rates.

#### The counterplan only works with centralized police processes that ensure individual police play less of a role. Limiting QI is decentralization which forces individual police to be held responsible – that tanks strong bureaucratic management which is key to CompStat.

James J. Willis et al, 2003

James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski, David Weisburd. “COMPSTAT IN PRACTICE: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THREE CITIES”, Police Foundation, pg 21-22. https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/compstat-in-practice-an-in-depth-analysis-of-three-cities/

More importantly, in the absence of other structures, our observations showed that line officers experienced accountability far less acutely than the district commanders. Furthermore, how they experienced Compstat as an overall program was opposite to that of the department’s middle managers. Since Compstat holds command staff directly accountable for resolving crime problems, middle managers were under a great deal of pressure to implement crime strategies. At the weekly or biweekly Compstat meetings, it was imperative that a district commander be able to demonstrate that he or she had identified any crime problem and had already implemented a response. In Newark, the stock response to the chief’s question about whether a crime response had been implemented was “as we speak.” In contrast, the primary responsibility of patrol officers was to follow the orders that flowed from district commanders and their executive officers down the chain of command. As a result of the pressure on district commanders, Compstat concentrates strategic decision making at the top of the organizational hierarchy rather than promoting initiative among the lower ranks. By limiting the decision-making autonomy of patrol officers, **Compstat contradicts one of the central tenets of community- and problem- oriented policing—decentralized decision making resulting from a delegation of authority to initiate problem solving at th e level of the rank a nd file** (Goldstein 1990; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990). Responses to our national survey and intensive site interviews showed that departments that have implemented a Compstat-like program consider internal accountability to be a very important feature. Certainly punishing middle managers for failing to meet the standards of Compstat accountability is a key element of this model. Nearly seven in ten of these departments told us that a district commander would be “somewhat” or “very likely” to be replaced if he or she “did not know about the crime patterns” in the district. A much smaller proportion of these departments reported that a district commander would be replaced simply because crime continued to rise in a district (Weisburd et al. 2001). This perhaps reflects Compstat’s demand that commanders be familiar with problems and initiate solutions to them, though they are not held accountable for achieving outcomes that may be unresponsive to well-planned police interventions (Bratton 1998). While the use of “punishment,” in the form of a rebuke from the chief, to maintain accountability was very much apparent in Compstat meetings, we found that departments were much less likely to use tangible rewards to ensure internal accountability. If crime in a district declined, less than a quarter of Compstat departments reported that it was “very” or “somewhat likely” that the district commander would be rewarded with a promotion or desired job assignment (Weisburd et al. 2001, 32-34). Lowell, Minneapolis, and Newark fit very closely to the more general findings of our national survey. Like police departments nationwide, internal accountability was an integral component of their Compstat programs. Lowe ll’s police chief explicitly recognized the importance of this feature when he defined Compstat as a means “to manage the police department in a timely manner with an eye toward accountability.” Similarly, Newark’s chief commented that in his twenty-eight years on the force middle mangers were not held accountable for crime levels, clearance rates, response time, and police corruption. “Compstat,” he said, “turned that upside down. We now have developed a new culture, and what you see now in terms of Compstat today represents a total cultural change. And I think that’s the biggest part of Compstat.” A high-ranking official in the Minneapolis Police Department stated, “When I hear CODEFOR, I don’t think of increases in street arrests, I think of accountability.”

#### CompStat can be used to map instances of police misconduct – enables departments to limit behavior that produces lawsuits and ensures accountability - that solves the case while saving billions.

Robert Hennelly, 2015

“Poisonous cops, total immunity: Why an epidemic of police abuse is actually going unpunished” http://www.salon.com/2015/05/13/poisonous\_cops\_total\_immunity\_why\_an\_epidemic\_of\_police\_abuse\_is\_actually\_going\_unpunished/

“There’s just no effort to track nationally the allegations of police misconduct that these suits and settlements reveal,” says Joanna Schwartz, a professor of law at UCLA and one of the nation’s leading experts on police misconduct civil litigation. “These costs from lawsuits translate to money lost for other priorities in a time of austerity for local governments.” No matter how big the settlement might be, Schwartz notes that police officers enjoy a qualified immunity that shields them from personal liability for whatever actions they take while on the job. Schwartz asked 70 of the nation’s largest police departments to submit the total amount they paid out to settle police misconduct cases from 2006 to 2011. [Forty-four of the 70 agencies responded](https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?tab=wm&pli=1#search/schwartz%40law.ucla.edu/14813767d214973a?projector=1). All told, they paid out $730 million to settle 9,225 civil rights suits. Yet in just one half of one percent of those settlements were officers required to pay anything. Schwartz says few local governments mine the lawsuits for critical data on patterns of police behavior that generate the lawsuits in the first place. Schwartz points to the NYPD’s CompStat program as an applicable model that tracks major crimes by precinct on a weekly basis and is credited with helping the New York City significantly reduce crime. “What gets measured gets managed. Why not use the same strategy when it comes to police misconduct revealed through lawsuits?” In New York City alone, during Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s three term tenure, NYPD payouts were in excess of $1 billion dollars. In FY 2013 the City of New York paid out more than $138 million. In FY 2014, that number spiked to nearly $217 million, just to settle claims from allegations of false arrest, excessive force and civil rights violations. Just imagine what the national total of these settlements must be. Schwartz’s idea of a CompStat approach to tracking police misconduct suits already is being implemented in New York City. Getting a handle on the huge dollar amount in annual NYPD payouts, as well as zeroing in on the police behavior that prompted them, has become a major focus of the city’s comptroller, Scott Stringer. Stringer has inaugurated [ClaimStat](http://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/claimstat/), modeled on the NYPD’s crime tracking precinct based CompStat, that tracks the law suit settlements made on behalf of all of the City’s agencies including the NYPD. “For far too long, big cities and small towns across the country have accepted rising claims and settlements—and the injuries and injustice that precipitate them—as the cost of doing business,” says Stringer. “ClaimStat is designed to change that by using data to help identify hot spots before they become problems, just as the NYPD did with CompStat two decades ago. As a result, my office is working closely with Commissioner Bratton’s Risk Assessment Unit to share claims data in real time **and obtain evidence that helps us to separate legitimate claims from frivolous suits**.”

## 1NC – CompStat Only

#### Counterplan: The United States will implement CompStat technology in police departments and maintain status-quo qualified immunity.

#### CompStat is a management and analysis tool that uses computers to highlight crime patterns – it’s effective at reducing crime.

Inimai M. Chettiar, 2015

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More importantly, in the absence of other structures, our observations showed that line officers experienced accountability far less acutely than the district commanders. Furthermore, how they experienced Compstat as an overall program was opposite to that of the department’s middle managers. Since Compstat holds command staff directly accountable for resolving crime problems, middle managers were under a great deal of pressure to implement crime strategies. At the weekly or biweekly Compstat meetings, it was imperative that a district commander be able to demonstrate that he or she had identified any crime problem and had already implemented a response. In Newark, the stock response to the chief’s question about whether a crime response had been implemented was “as we speak.” In contrast, the primary responsibility of patrol officers was to follow the orders that flowed from district commanders and their executive officers down the chain of command. As a result of the pressure on district commanders, Compstat concentrates strategic decision making at the top of the organizational hierarchy rather than promoting initiative among the lower ranks. By limiting the decision-making autonomy of patrol officers, **Compstat contradicts one of the central tenets of community- and problem- oriented policing—decentralized decision making resulting from a delegation of authority to initiate problem solving at the level of the rank and file** (Goldstein 1990; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990). Responses to our national survey and intensive site interviews showed that departments that have implemented a Compstat-like program consider internal accountability to be a very important feature. Certainly punishing middle managers for failing to meet the standards of Compstat accountability is a key element of this model. Nearly seven in ten of these departments told us that a district commander would be “somewhat” or “very likely” to be replaced if he or she “did not know about the crime patterns” in the district. A much smaller proportion of these departments reported that a district commander would be replaced simply because crime continued to rise in a district (Weisburd et al. 2001). This perhaps reflects Compstat’s demand that commanders be familiar with problems and initiate solutions to them, though they are not held accountable for achieving outcomes that may be unresponsive to well-planned police interventions (Bratton 1998). While the use of “punishment,” in the form of a rebuke from the chief, to maintain accountability was very much apparent in Compstat meetings, we found that departments were much less likely to use tangible rewards to ensure internal accountability. If crime in a district declined, less than a quarter of Compstat departments reported that it was “very” or “somewhat likely” that the district commander would be rewarded with a promotion or desired job assignment (Weisburd et al. 2001, 32-34). Lowell, Minneapolis, and Newark fit very closely to the more general findings of our national survey. Like police departments nationwide, internal accountability was an integral component of their Compstat programs. Lowe ll’s police chief explicitly recognized the importance of this feature when he defined Compstat as a means “to manage the police department in a timely manner with an eye toward accountability.” Similarly, Newark’s chief commented that in his twenty-eight years on the force middle mangers were not held accountable for crime levels, clearance rates, response time, and police corruption. “Compstat,” he said, “turned that upside down. We now have developed a new culture, and what you see now in terms of Compstat today represents a total cultural change. And I think that’s the biggest part of Compstat.” A high-ranking official in the Minneapolis Police Department stated, “When I hear CODEFOR, I don’t think of increases in street arrests, I think of accountability.”

# Frontline

## Overview – Explaination

#### CompStat is a combination of management tactics, technology, and statistical analysis. Computer algorithms help track geographic locations where crime is more prevalent while revealing patterns to make policing more effective. Alongside technology, regular meetings and reports help create internal reform by holding officers accountable – they’ll be demoted or lose their status if they are ineffective or violate certain standards. It has been implemented in over forty cities nationwide and shows results with an average decrease in crime of 10% - that’s Chettiar 15.

#### CompStat is also being used to track police lawsuits – ClaimStat enables departments to look for patterns in officers and locations related to the filing of civil suits. That helps root out abusive policing and deter abusive practice, which solves the affirmative – That’s Hennelly 15.

## Overview – Competition

### Centralization

#### The counterplan’s implementation is competitive with the affirmative.

#### CompStat requires centralization of police processes – that means strong bureaucracy and internal control. It only functions with high-ranking officers being able to reprimand officers for failures, police chiefs having primary firing authority – it necessitates a top-down management system. Limiting qualified immunity devolves responsibility onto individual officers which pushes decentralization and kills CompStat implementation and effectiveness.

## NY Specific

### General

#### Err heavily negative when all of their arguments are specific to New York’s CompStat deployment – here’s a list of 10 cities excluded from their analysis:

#### Austin

#### Baltimore

#### Los Angeles

#### Nashville

#### New Haven

#### Oakland

#### Philadelphia

#### San Francisco

#### Washington DC

#### Detroit

#### Here’s a line from our Chettiar evidence that proves our statistics are more rigorous than just NY–

We analyzed crime data from the 50 largest cities. Forty-one currently use some form of CompStat

## Racism/Stop-And-Frisk

### Data Mapping Showed Ineffective

#### CompStat helped show that stop and frisk was statistically ineffective – it was part of reform that ended it.

James Cullen, 04/11/16

“Ending New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Did Not Increase Crime”, Brennan Center for Justice, https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/ending-new-yorks-stop-and-frisk-did-not-increase-crime

The stop-and-frisk era formally drew to a close in January 2014, when newly-elected Mayor de Blasio settled the litigation and ended the program. In the years leading up to the program’s official end, stops had already begun to plummet, **leading** [**article after article**](http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/exclusive-big-fall-stop-and-frisk-criminals-bolder-article-1.2247406) **to claim that a jump in crime was just around the corner**. All of the hard work of previous mayors and police chiefs could be undone, some said. This alarm turned out to be both premature and incorrect, and data from the history of the program indicates this shouldn’t be much of a surprise. After growing slowly in the early 2000s, stop-and-frisk began to rapidly increase in 2006, [when there were 500,000 stops](http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data) citywide. By 2011 the number peaked at 685,000. It then began to fall, first to 533,000 stops in 2012. Given this large scale effort, one might expect crime generally, and murder specifically, to increase as stops tapered off between 2012 and 2014. Instead, as shown in Figure 1, the number of murders fell while the number of stops declined. Murder also continued to drop after as stop-and-frisk wound down from its 2011 peak. In fact, the biggest fall in murder rates occurred precisely when the number of stops also fell by a large amount — in 2013. Figure 2 shows that crime in general also fell, both while the number of stops increased andfell. Crime continued to decline as the program wound to its 2014 close. Statistically, no relationship between stop-and-frisk and crime seems apparent. New York [remains safer](https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/crime-2015-preliminary-analysis) than it was 5, 10, or 25 years ago. As [analysis by the Brennan Center](https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/what-caused-crime-decline) has shown, a part of this was the introduction of CompStat, which allowed police to consult data when making decisions about where and how to respond to crime. Listening to the data has made New Yorkers safer, and it’s important to listen again. It says loud and clear: ending stop-and-frisk didn’t cause a crime wave in the city.

## Misrepresented Data

### Changing Now

#### The audit that showed misrepresentation was in 2013 – it’s not indicative of CompStat now – especially when Commissioners planned to fix holes and ordered the review himself.

Jeff Morganteen, 2013

“What The CompStat Audit Reveals About The NYPD” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/12/nypd-compstat\_n\_3587637.html

“**A close review of the NYPD’s statistics and analysis demonstrate that the misclassification of reports may have an appreciable effect on certain reported crime rates**,” the report said. Two former federal prosecutors turned private attorneys, David Kelley and Sharon McCarthy, conducted the review. (A third attorney, Robert Morvillo, died while the audit was underway.) **Commissioner Kelly commissioned the review in early 2011 amid mounting pressure** in the wake of Eterno’s and Silverman’s research as well as [media coverage](http://www.villagevoice.com/2010-06-15/news/adrian-school-craft-nypd-tapes-whistleblower/) of audiotapes secretly recorded by police officer Adrian Schoolcraft, who suffered retribution for his attempts to expose crime downgrades. **Police Commissioner Ray Kelly said the department would embrace the report’s recommendations and adopt more stringent audit protocols. The report called for a formalized external review program of CompStat auditing measures, more accountability toward officers and supervisors behind “egregious” reporting errors, and a more transparent reporting process regarding statistical error rates.**

### Postdate

#### Our evidence postdates theirs and is from a wider range of sources than solely New York – that’s Chettiar – here’s a line from the ev:

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## Crime + Solvency

#### CompStat is empirically effective in the biggest city in the United States – police departments are held accountable and crime decreases significantly – here’s more evidence that analyses New York in depth.

Jonathan Dienst et al, 04/16/16

Jonathan Dienst, Rich McHugh, Evan Stulberger. “An Inside Look at the System That Cut Crime in New York By 75 Percent”, NBC News. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/inside-look-system-cut-crime-new-york-75-percent-n557031

Compstat, a statistical system for tracking crime, was introduced by Police Commissioner Bill Bratton and his deputy, Jack Maple, in 1994, during Bratton's first stint as head of the NYPD. Twenty-two years later, Bratton is once again the top cop in Gotham, **Compstat is still in use, and crime has fallen 75 percent** — a fact Bratton calls a "New York miracle." **The city had 1,946 murders in 1993, or more than a five a day. It had 352 in 2015. The system is based on tracking and stopping smaller crimes to stop bigger crimes, and to pinpoint hotspots where crimes are clustered. It has since been exported to other cities, like Philadelphia and Los Angeles,** where Bratton also served as chief of police. The NYPD recently allowed NBC News unprecedented access to one of its weekly Compstat meetings at One Police Plaza in downtown Manhattan. Television monitors displaying stats, graphs and maps lined the walls, above long tables filled with about 200 high-ranking officers. At one end of the room were the bosses, lobbing the questions, and at the other end was a podium, where precinct commanders like Valdez took turns trying to answer them. Valdez was assigned to the 40th Precinct several months ago to address a spike in crime. Valdez deployed extra officers to streets with jumps in robberies. He also met with detectives about unsolved cases big and small — from murders to burglary patterns. "**Analyzing data, deploying resources and vigorous follow-up, that is Compstat**," Valdez said. "In the end**, crime prevention is** really **the goal**." While NBC News was visiting and recording his team at work in the Bronx, someone shot a young man to death nearby — right next to a playground, in the middle of the afternoon. In a separate incident several weeks ago, two police officers were fired on. And burglaries have soared 400 percent in just a month. Valdez opened his case book to reveal more than 100 crimes that needed solving. At the Compstat meeting, the interrogators pressed Valdez for minute details of the precinct's crime pattern, all the way down to how many smartphones have been reported stolen. "I want to say it's nine," said Valdez. "How many have we obtained and put an alarm on those phones?" Shea asked. "I'll have to get back to you on that," answered a member of the Four-o squad. O'Neill told Valdez and his team they could do better. "If you have a robbery problem, everybody up at that podium needs to be tuned in. I'm not sure I'm hearing that." Valdez wasn't the only precinct commander to get grilled. Next up was Fausto Pichardo of the 43rd Precinct, also in the Bronx. Pichardo's precinct had no homicides to report — but O'Neill was quick to point out the area had the highest volume of robberies in the city. "We took six robberies in sector Eddie," Pichardo responded. "We immediately deployed a dedicated uniformed robbery order on each single platoon." After the meeting, O'Neill told NBC News the point is not to embarrass anyone, but to ensure success. "We're not looking to throw curveballs at people … [we] just want to make sure their whole operation is efficient," he said. "I know Carlos will turn the Four-o around," he added. Bratton, meanwhile, said commanders need to be held accountable — but he also praised the ones in the Bronx for the overall reduction in violence. "We have never had a two-month period beginning of a year with so few shootings," he said. O'Neill said he thinks the rigorous public interrogation that precinct commanders endure helps make a difference in crime in the city. "**There is direct accountability**," he said. "I think **that's the genius of Compstat**."

## Where’s the Money?

### General

#### Hennelly 15 indicates that CompStat decreases the amount of lawsuits which generates income that can be allocated to increasing officers.

#### Chettiar indicates that things like the Crime Bill are examples of legislation and policy-making that can enable funds for police.

#### Normal means – taxes, allocation of funds – that gives the aff solvency presses and turns they can go for in the 2AR.